Brevet, secret et concurrence technologique: Comment protéger les instruments de recherche ?

Étienne Pfister ()
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Étienne Pfister: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREDESPO - Centre de Recherche et d'Etude en Droit et Science Politique [Dijon] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Abstract: This article uses a two-step technological race model to evaluate the optimal protection of new research instruments, i.e., inventions that are not directly associated to commercial profits but that facilitate further technological progress. We show that paradoxically, granting the patentee an exclusive ownership right over all the research line and related applications (prospect doctrine) is optimal only when the R&D costs are relatively low and when the courts can implement mixed strategies regarding the settlement of patent trials (thus implying that identical legal cases lead to differing outcomes). In other settings, the court should rather force the infringer to pay a license fee proportionate to the R&D savings generated by the disclosure of the research instrument (enablement doctrine).

Keywords: Technological race; Patent; Secrecy; Trial; Course technologique; Brevet; Secret; Procès (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2004, 114 (3), pp.323-352. ⟨10.3917/redp.143.0323⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279321

DOI: 10.3917/redp.143.0323

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