Meet-or-release and most-favoured-customer clauses with price-quantity competition yield Cournot outcomes

Claude d'Aspremont and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira

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Abstract: It is shown that, in a well-defined market environment where demand is such that market revenue is decreasing in price, if all firms compete simultaneously in prices and quantities, and offer sales contracts which combine the meet-or-release clause with a most-favored-customer clause, then the industry sub-game perfect equilibrium will coincide with the Cournot solution.

Keywords: Competition policy; Facilitating practices; Meet-or-release clause; Most-favoured-customer clause; Clause du client le plus favorisé; Clause d’alignement; Politique de la concurrence; Pratiques de la nature à faciliter l’interaction coordonnée (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Economie publique : Etudes et recherches = Public economics, 2006, 17 (2), pp.221-230. ⟨10.4000/economiepublique.3040⟩

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Working Paper: Meet-or-release and most-favored-customer clauses with price-quantity competition yield Cournot outcomes (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279365

DOI: 10.4000/economiepublique.3040

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