La politique de diffusion de l'information: La transparence des banques centrales est-elle toujours préférable?

Jean-Pierre Allegret () and Camille Cornand
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Jean-Pierre Allegret: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines

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Abstract: Transparency is one of the main pillars of central banks and international institutions. From their point of view, higher informational transparency improves their efficacy. The aim of this paper is to evaluate in what extent this strategy is beneficial or not. It proposes a survey of the literature based on coordination games. We show that an increase in informational transparency can lead to sub-optimal results. Indeed in providing a focal point for the beliefs of agents, public information facilitates coordination and so over-reaction behaviors. We do not deduce from this result that transparency is useless. We stress that it is necessary to adapt the communication policy to an environment characterized by strategic complementarities. To this end, we analyze several tools of information disclosure.

Date: 2006
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Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 2006, 21 (1), pp.87-126. ⟨10.3406/rfeco.2006.1590⟩

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Journal Article: La politique de diffusion de l'information: la transparence des banques centrales est-elle toujours préférable ? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279383

DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2006.1590

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