Evolutionary games, learning processes and stochastic equilibria an application to Hayek’s norms economics
Jeux évolutionnistes, processus d'apprentissage et équilibres stochastiques: Une application à l’économie des conventions chez Hayek
Thierry Aimar and
Francis Bismans
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Thierry Aimar: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Francis Bismans: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
This article deals with the genesis and dynamics of conventions in Hayek. It uses the theory of evolutionary games to develop a general model of learning by the agents. It also aims at giving an economic interpretation of the process by which the norms are generated and selected.
Keywords: Austrian school of economics; Conventions; Evolutionary games; Hayek Friedrich; Institutions; Learning; Stochastically stable equilibria; École autrichienne d'économie politique; Équilibres stochastiquement stables; Jeux évolutionnistes; Modèles d'apprentissage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2006, 116 (5), pp.633-656. ⟨10.3917/redp.165.0633⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279390
DOI: 10.3917/redp.165.0633
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