Le juge et l'économiste: réflexions sur la théorie hayékienne du droit

Samuel Ferey ()
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Samuel Ferey: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The article focuses on a tension in the Hayekian representation of legal rules. While rules perform an essential function of coordination by providing common interpretation about the legitimate expectations, Hayek does not really develop the mechanisms by which common interpretations may emerge. Firstly, the functions of coordination of rules are presented. We show then that rules are constituted by individual meanings. Finally we show none of the two mechanisms producing shared interpretations, the sense of justice and the judge, is able to guarantee the resolution of conflicts of interpretation between individuals. Such a conflict questions therefore spontaneous order's efficiency and justice.

Date: 2008
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Published in Cahiers d'Economie Politique = Papers in political economy, 2008, 1 (83), pp.57-83. ⟨10.3917/cep.054.0057⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279417

DOI: 10.3917/cep.054.0057

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