An Economic Analysis of Conflicts Resolution in Cyberspace

Bruno Deffains (), Yannick Gabuthy () and Philippe Fenoglio
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Bruno Deffains: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Yannick Gabuthy: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Philippe Fenoglio: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The development of the Internet is accompanied by legal risks which induce law and economics scholars to study the question of the appropriate judicial order for efficiently treating the conflicts originating in cyberspace. It is generally accepted that public regulation, which deals with the majority of offline conflicts, is unsuitable or inefficient in the virtual world. A private regulatory system would offer a number of advantages. It is frequently justified by arguments such as the territorial incompetence of classical courts of jurisdiction, and their technical incompetence when faced with anonymous subjects such as those found in cyberspace. Public justice is also characterized by slow management and settlement of conflicts and by high administrative costs, notably in cases where conflicts concern small amounts of money.

Keywords: Internet; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Published in Éric Brousseau; Nicolas Curien. Internet and Digital Economics: Principles, Methods and Applications, Cambridge University Press, pp.539-568, 2005, 978-0521671842. ⟨10.1017/CBO9780511493201.019⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279431

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511493201.019

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