Contractual design and networks performance: empirical evidence from franchising

Magali Chaudey () and Muriel Fadairo ()
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Muriel Fadairo: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article, deals with the links between networks performance and the design of vertical contracts. It provides evidence broadly consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, constraining contracts for the retailers favour a better performance at the network level.

Keywords: franchising networks; réseaux de franchise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Applied Economics, 2010, 42 (4), pp.529-533. ⟨10.1080/00036840701704428⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00360076

DOI: 10.1080/00036840701704428

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