The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate

Jean-François Laslier

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Abstract: The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

Keywords: Approval; Voting; •; Condorcet; •; rationality; •; sincerity; •; strategic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

Published in Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, 21 (1), pp.113-136. ⟨10.1177/0951629808097286⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00363218

DOI: 10.1177/0951629808097286

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