Self enforceable paths in extensive form games: a behavorial approach based on interactivity

Jean-Pierre Ponssard

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper explores the idea of forward induction for extensive games. It interprets this idea as a general behavioral principle the technical details of which have to be worked out in each specific case. Because of its cooperative ingredient, this approach should be contrasted with the usual approaches of non-cooperative game theory which are rooted in individual rationality.

Keywords: Forward induction; Nash refinements; focal points (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Theory and Decision, 1990, 29 (1), pp.69-83. ⟨10.1007/BF00134105⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00364244

DOI: 10.1007/BF00134105

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().