A note on the L-P formulation of zero sum sequential games with incomplete information

Jean-Pierre Ponssard

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Abstract: Zero-sum games with incomplete information are formulated as linear programs in which the players' behavioral strategies appear as primal and dual variables. Known properties for these games may then be derived from duality theory.

Date: 1975
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 1975, 4 (1), pp.1-5. ⟨10.1007/BF01766398⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00364274

DOI: 10.1007/BF01766398

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