How efficient can International compensation regimes be in pollution prevention? A discussion of the case of marine oil spills

Julien Hay ()
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Julien Hay: AMURE - Aménagement des Usages des Ressources et des Espaces marins et littoraux - Centre de droit et d'économie de la mer - IFREMER - Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer - UBO - Université de Brest - IUEM - Institut Universitaire Européen de la Mer - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - UBO - Université de Brest - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies the detterent effect of the compensation regime defined by the CLC and FUND convention in the fiels of marine oil pollution, taking into account its voluntary nature. We apply to the case of oil pollution compensation a model derived from the economic analysis of international environmental agreements. We analyse the deterrent impact of a self-enforcing international compensation regime. We show in particular that the preventive effect of such compensation regime is a negative function of (i) the number of countries at stake in the fiels of oil pollution and (ii) the financial compensation limits.

Date: 2008-06-25
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Published in 16th Annual Conference EAERE 2008, Jun 2008, Gothenburg, Sweden

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00369492

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