A Note on the Characterization of Nash Networks

Pascal Billand and Christophe Bravard ()
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Christophe Bravard: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Abstract: In the present paper, we are interested in the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000) [Bala, V., Goyal, S., 2000. A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica, N. 68 (5), 1181-1229]. We generalize this model by relaxing the authors' assumption concerning the relation between the number of resources obtained by an agent and this agent's payoffs. Firstly, we show that Nash networks are line bases and strict Nash networks are minimum line bases. Secondly, we establish that efficient networks are minimum line bases.

Keywords: Networks; Non-cooperative game theory; Line bases (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2005, 49 (3), pp.355-365. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.10.003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00372481

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.10.003

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