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Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-Poor Microfinance Institutions

Cécile Aubert (), Elisabeth Sadoulet () and Alain de Janvry ()

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Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00382221
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Published in Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, 2009, 90 (1), pp.153-162

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