Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-Poor Microfinance Institutions
Cécile Aubert (),
Elisabeth Sadoulet () and
Alain de Janvry ()
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Published in Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, 2009, 90 (1), pp.153-162
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Journal Article: Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00382221
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