Innovation in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

Yann Ménière () and Sarah Parlane

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Abstract: We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two firms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative effects of litigation threats on innovation. We define an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that will implement socially efficient R&D investments in the case of symmetric and asymmetric patent portfolios.

Keywords: Innovation; Brevet; Contrefaçon; Litige; Investissement efficace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-00397130v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Review of Industrial Organization, 2008, 32 (2), pp.95-111. ⟨10.1007/s11151-008-9167-y⟩

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Journal Article: Innovation in the Shadow of Patent Litigation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00397130

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-008-9167-y

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