Public Private Agreements, Institutions and Competition: when Economic Theory meets Facts

Stephane Saussier (), Carine Staropoli () and Anne Yvrande-Billon ()
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Carine Staropoli: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Anne Yvrande-Billon: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: While, in practice, the participation of private actors at the local and national government levels through various types of contractual agreements has been increasing over the last decades, there are still few studies on the functioning and performances of such relationships. Our aim is to highlight some significant theoretical and empirical issues concerning Public–Private Agreements. We first assess the potential sources of efficiency of such contractual agreements. We then examine the selection issue which is a crucial stage for the efficiency of such agreement. Finally, we stress the importance of the institutional framework showing how it might affect the agreements' efficiency.

Keywords: Contracts; Institutions; Procurement auctions; Public–private agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Review of Industrial Organization, 2009, 35 (1-2), pp.1-18. ⟨10.1007/s11151-009-9226-z⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public–Private Agreements, Institutions, and Competition: When Economic Theory Meets Facts (2009)
Working Paper: Public Private Agreements, Institutions and Competition: when Economic Theory meets Facts (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00429712

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-009-9226-z

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