Trusting Behavior in a Repeated Investment Game

Francois Cochard, Phu Nguyen Van () and Marc Willinger
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Phu Nguyen Van: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Phu Nguyen-Van

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Abstract: We compare a seven period repeated investment game to the one-shot investment game. On an average, in the repeated game, player A (the "trustor") sends more and player B (the "trustee") returns a larger percentage than in the one-shot game. Both the amount sent and the percentage returned increase up to period 5 and drop sharply thereafter. The "reciprocity hypothesis" for B players' behavior is compatible with the first five periods, but in the two end periods, most B players behaved strategically by not returning. The "reciprocity hypothesis" for A players' behavior is compatible for all periods of the game.

Keywords: Investment game; Trust; Reciprocity; Repetition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2004, 55 (1), pp.31-44. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2003.07.004⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00459746

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.07.004

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