Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985

David Thesmar, Antoinette Schoar and Marianne Bertrand

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We investigate how the deregulation of the French banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets. Following deregulation, banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank-dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities. At the industry level, we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation, an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms, and a decline in concentration. Overall, these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a Schumpeterian process of "creative destruction."

Keywords: Banking Deregulation; Industry Structure; French; Banking Reforms; 1985 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (238)

Published in The Journal of Finance, 2007, Vol.62,n°2, pp.597-628. ⟨10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.4.709⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985 (2007)
Working Paper: Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985 (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00461082

DOI: 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.4.709

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().