Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Alessandro Citanna (), Archishman Chakraborty and Michael Ostrovsky
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Alessandro Citanna: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences.

Keywords: Interdependent values; Stability; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145 (1), pp.85-105. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00463247

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004

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