Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision

Brian Hill ()

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Abstract: In the companion paper (Towards a "sophisticated" model of belief dynamics. Part I), a general framework for realistic modelling of instantaneous states of belief and of the operations involving them was presented and motivated. In this paper, the framework is applied to the case of belief revision. A model of belief revision shall be obtained which, firstly, recovers the Gärdenfors postulates in a well-specified, natural yet simple class of particular circumstances; secondly, can accommodate iterated revisions, recovering several proposed revision operators for iterated revision as special cases; and finally, offers an analysis of Rott's recent counterexample to several Gärdenfors postulates [32], elucidating in what sense it fails to be one of the special cases to which these postulates apply.

Keywords: Representations of belief; bounded rationality; logical omniscience; awareness; logical locality; belief dynamics; iterated revision; Gärdenfors postulates; rational choice theory; framing effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08-01
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Published in Studia Logica, 2008, Vol.89,n°3, pp.291-323. ⟨10.1007/s11225-008-9130-9⟩

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Working Paper: Towards a "sophisticated" model of belief dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00463440

DOI: 10.1007/s11225-008-9130-9

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