Protéger la concurrence ou protéger les concurrents ? L'affaire Intel en perspective
Frédéric Marty and
Julien Pillot ()
Post-Print from HAL
Abstract:
While the European Commission have imposed a huge fine on Intel (almost €1.07 billion) for having abused of its dominance on the microprocessor's industry, US antitrust authorities seem much more reluctant to settle suits brought by AMD - the Intel's sole serious competitor on this market - in the same way. Our present purpose is to analyze the reasons likely to explain those transatlantic divergences in competition policies relative to fidelity rebates granted by dominant undertakings.
Keywords: Monopolisation; fidelity rebates; foreclusion; Abus de position dominante; remises de fidélité; stratégies d'éviction anticoncurrentielle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00464409
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in Revue Economique et Sociale, 2009, 2009-4, pp. 65-74
Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00464409/document (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464409
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().