Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Tristan Tomala

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Abstract: This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.

Keywords: Repeated games; Imperfect monitoring; Communication equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, Vol.67,n°2, pp.682-694. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464537

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005

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