Repeated communication through the mechanism and

Nicolas Vieille () and Olivier Gossner

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Abstract: We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

Keywords: Repeated communication; Mechanism And (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol.30,n°1, pp.41-60. ⟨10.1007/s001820100063⟩

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Working Paper: Repeated communication through the mechanism “and” (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00465040

DOI: 10.1007/s001820100063

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