Les critères de détermination de la part variable de la rémunération des dirigeants du CAC 40

Gregory Heem ()
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Gregory Heem: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyze the bonuses performance conditions of the chief executive officer in the largest French companies (by using the CAC 40 companies' 2007 annual report). Among financial economists, the dominant approach to the study of executive compensation is the agency theory. Under this approach boards are assumed to design compensation schemes to provide managers with efficient incentives to maximize shareholder value. Therefore our results show that CEO's are assessed on financial performance based fee (dividend yield, stock price) as suggested by the agency theory, social or environmental considerations are inexistent.

Keywords: Agency theory; compensation; CEO; Bonus; théorie de l'agence; performance; rémunération; dirigeants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00476935
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Published in Crises et nouvelles problématiques de la Valeur, May 2010, Nice, France. pp.CD-ROM

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