Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources

Rodolphe Durand () and Vicente Vargas
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Rodolphe Durand: EM - EMLyon Business School
Vicente Vargas: USD - University of San Diego

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Abstract: The principal-agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 x 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms.

Keywords: data envelopment analysis (DEA); private firms; productive efficiency; agency theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

Published in Strategic Management Journal, 2003, 24 (7), pp. 667-675. ⟨10.1002/smj.321⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00480849

DOI: 10.1002/smj.321

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