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TENIR SON RANG: LE CONTROLE DE GESTION DANS LA DYNAMIQUE DU PARTAGE DES RESPONSABILITES AU SEIN DES GROUPES DE SOCIETES

François-Régis Puyou ()
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François-Régis Puyou: Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School

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Abstract: This work deals with the dynamic of the distribution of responsibilities within large firms. It studies the mecanisms and the stakes that settle the tension between autonomy and control through the observation of management accounting practices. It clarifies the actors' intentions that trigger the evolutions in the control of subsidiairies. It is argued that managers from the parent companies are mostly trying to maintain their position in the exchanges between entities. Far from being neutral, management accounting tools and procedures are important sources of influence during negotiations around the distribution of legitimate tasks and responsibilities in business groups.

Keywords: Business groups; management accounting; parent companies. Goold and Campbell; case study; Groupes; contrôle de gestion; maison mère; Goold et Campbell; étude de cas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00481091
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Published in Crises et nouvelles problématiques de la Valeur, May 2010, Nice, France. pp.CD-ROM

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