Two-player stochastic games I: A reduction

Nicolas Vieille ()

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Abstract: This paper is the first step in the proof of existence of equilibrium payoffs for two-player stochastic games with finite state and action sets. It reduces the existence problem to the class of so-called positive absorbing recursive games. The existence problem for this class is solved in a subsequent paper.

Keywords: stochastic; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Israel Journal of Mathematics, 2000, Vol.119,n°1, pp.55-91. ⟨10.1007/BF02810663⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481401

DOI: 10.1007/BF02810663

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