INFORMATIONS AUX ACTIONNAIRES ET INFORMATIONS AUX SALARIÉS: UNE ANALYSE TEXTUELLE DU RAPPORT ANNUEL ET DU RAPPORT DE L'EXPERT-COMPTABLE DU COMITÉ D'ENTREPRISE

Mathieu Floquet
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Mathieu Floquet: LOG - Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion (1998-2011) - UO - Université d'Orléans

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Abstract: The shareholder model of governance increases the diffusion of information by the firm to its shareholder. But, the impact of this increase of information for the other stakeholder is not identified. This article examines the difference of the lexical world between the information for the shareholder and the useless information for the employees using a textual data analysis. This difference refutes the hypothesis that an increase of information for the shareholder is, also, benefit for the other stakeholder.

Keywords: Analysis of textual data; Information; Stakeholder model; Work council.; Analyse textuelle; Comité d'entreprise; Gouvernance partenariale; Information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-10
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Published in Crises et nouvelles problématiques de la Valeur, May 2010, Nice, France. pp.CD-ROM

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481504

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