On the order of eliminating dominated strategies

Itzhak Gilboa, Ehud Kalai and E. Zemel

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Abstract: It is known that different orders of eliminating dominated strategies in n-person games may yield different reduced games. One gives conditions which guarantee that the reduced game is unique. For finite games, the conditions include the well-known cases of strict dominance, and in a slightly weaker form, of regular dominance for zero sum and similar games

Keywords: Zero sum game; Dominance; Player strategy; Game theory; strategy domination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Operations Research Letters, 1990, Vol.9, n°2, pp. 85-89. ⟨10.1016/0167-6377(90)90046-8⟩

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Working Paper: On The Order of Eliminating Dominated Strategies (1988)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481648

DOI: 10.1016/0167-6377(90)90046-8

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