Individual Dismissal and Incentives

Incitations et licenciement individuel

Eve-Angeline Lambert and Yannick Gabuthy ()
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Yannick Gabuthy: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article presents a survey of the literature which analyses the effects of the Employment Protection Legislation, especially concerning the individual dismissal, on the behavior of economic agents involved in a labor relationship. These analyses show that the legal rules applying to the breach of such a relationship are not neutral. Indeed, they influence not only the behavior of parties at the time of the breach (e.g. concerning the choice of the type of dismissal or the bargaining over the severance pay) but also during the work relationship (especially in terms of specific investments incentives). In this respect, any legislative policy should take into account this reactive tendency of economic actors in order to make legal rules related to dismissal more efficient.

Date: 2008
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Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 2008, 23 (1), pp.3-50. ⟨10.3406/rfeco.2008.1659⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00485102

DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2008.1659

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