Droit et gouvernance:l'apport du courant comportemental

Gerard Charreaux

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Under the dominant approach to corporate governance, the role of law is to help reduce the impact of conflicts of interest and intentional strategic behavior of the different actors, including managers. The managers' decisions that are detrimental to shareholders and other stakeholders do not all have their origin in an intentional behavior. Some of them result of misjudgment, cognitive and behavioral biases. Based on Behavioral Law and Economics, which has expanded greatly in the United States, the objective of the paper is to show that the role of law within the corporate governance system is also to contribute to "debias" managerial decisions or correct any adverse effects of these biases.

Keywords: behavioral bias; behavioral law and economics; libertarian patrenalism; behavioral corporate governance; biais comportemental; théorie comportementale du droit; paternalisme libertarien; théorie comportementale de la gouvernance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Véronique Magnier. La gouvernance des sociétés cotées face à la crise, Lextenso Editions, pp.223-246, 2010

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Droit et gouvernance:l’apport du courant comportemental (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00486485

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().