Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Olivier Gossner and Tristan Tomala

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Abstract: We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

Keywords: stochastic process; min-max values; signals; entropy; repeated games; secret correlation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2007, Vol.32,n°2, pp.413-424. ⟨10.1287/moor.1060.0248⟩

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Working Paper: Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00487954

DOI: 10.1287/moor.1060.0248

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