Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs

Tristan Tomala, Johannes Hörner and Stefano Lovo

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Keywords: Belief-free equilibria; Games; Known-own payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Conférence Théorie des jeux et applications, May 2009, Marseille, France

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00495690

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