Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory

Adrian van Deemen () and Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Adrian van Deemen: Institute for Management Research - Radboud University [Nijmegen]

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Abstract: This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow's Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.

Keywords: social choice theory; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Published in Adrian van Deemen, Agnieszka Rusinowska. Springer, pp.266, 2010, Theory and Decision Library C, Volume 43, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00514840

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6

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