Signaling and mediation in games with common interest

Dinah Rosenberg, Ehud Lehrer () and Eran Shmaya
Additional contact information
Ehud Lehrer: TAU - School of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Raymond and Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Tel Aviv University
Eran Shmaya: Kellogg [Northwestern] - Kellogg School of Management [Northwestern University, Evanston] - Northwestern University [Evanston]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential stochastic signals that depend on the actual state of nature. These signals provide the players with partial information about the state of nature and may also serve as a means of correlation. Different information structures induce different outcomes. An information structure is better than another, with respect to a certain solution concept, if the highest solution payoff it induces is at least that induced by the other structure. This paper characterizes the situation where one information structure is better than another with respect to various solution concepts: Nash equilibrium, strategic-normal-form correlated equilibrium, agent-normal-form correlated equilibrium and belief-invariant Bayesian solution. These solution concepts differ from one another in the scope of communication allowed between the players. The characterizations use maps that stochastically translate signals of one structure to signals of another.

Keywords: Bayesian games; common interest; garbling; information structure; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 68 (2), pp.670-682. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.007⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling and mediation in games with common interests (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00528396

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().