A Note on the Evaluation of Information in Zero-Sum Repeated Games

Dinah Rosenberg and Ehud Lehrer ()
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Ehud Lehrer: TAU - School of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Raymond and Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Tel Aviv University

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Abstract: Two players play a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information. Before the game starts one player receives a private signal that depends on the realized state of nature. The rules that govern the choice of the signal are determined by the information structure of the game. Different information structures induce different values. The value-of-information function of a game associates every information structure with the value it induces. We characterize those functions that are value-of-information functions for some zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information.

Keywords: Repeated games; Zero-sum games; Value-of-information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, 46 (4), pp.393-399. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.02.002⟩

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Journal Article: A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00537092

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.02.002

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