The newsvendor game has a non-empty core

Marco Scarsini, Alfred Müller and Moshe Shaked

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always non-empty, for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non-negative elements.

Keywords: cost allocation; inventory centralization; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, Vol. 38, N°1, pp. 118-126. ⟨10.1006/game.2001.0854⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00539841

DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0854

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().