Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device

Radu Vranceanu and Claire Naiditch

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Abstract: Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that, if migrants' income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount.

Keywords: Imperfect Information; Poverty; Remittances; Signaling; Information imparfaite; Pauvreté; Signal; Transferts des migrants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-00551869
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in 2009, 26 p

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Related works:
Journal Article: Remittances as a social status signaling device (2011)
Working Paper: Remittances as a social status signaling device (2011)
Working Paper: Remittances as a Social Status Signaling Device (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00551869

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