Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains

Philippe Choné and Laurent Linnemer

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The analysis of horizontal mergers hinges on a tradeoff between unilateral effects and efficiency gains. We examine the role of uncertainty in this tradeoff. In theory, the attitude towards uncertainty depends on the curvature of the social objective function. On the one hand, adjustment effects, both on the consumers' and firms' sides, tend to make consumers' surplus and firms' profits convex. On the other hand, pass-through effects may act in the opposite direction. We show that convexity prevails in a number of situations, including the most general linear demand model. Implications for empirical merger analysis are exposed.

Keywords: Merger analysis; Antitrust; Efficiency gains; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008, 26 (4), pp.913-929. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.08.002⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains (2008)
Working Paper: Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain Efficiency Gains (2006)
Working Paper: Assessing Horizontal Mergers under Uncertain Efficiency Gains (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00558175

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.08.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().