Prestigious organizations and heterodox choice in institutionally plural contexts

Rodolphe Durand () and Berangere Szostak ()
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Rodolphe Durand: HEC Paris - Recherche - Hors Laboratoire - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
Berangere Szostak: COACTIS - COnception de l'ACTIon en Situation - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Abstract: In unsettled fields with multiple ideal-typical institutional logics, why do organizations tend to weaken or conform to prevalent logic order? We argue that prestige –defined as a tribute paid by field members to a select few with valued distinctive traits– plays a determinant role in explaining institutional heterodoxy (i.e., the choice to stop instantiating dominant logics or start instantiating less prevalent logics). In unsettled fields, prestigious organizations adopt institutional heterodoxy to maintain their distinctiveness because they consider logics as means rather than constraining ends and because awarding bodies cannot impose strict obedience rules. Controlling for alternative explanations, a study of 165 French industrial design agencies (1989 to 2003) provides evidence that prestige favors the decision to undertake heterodox choices. This relationship is weakened when organizations diversify their expertise, is marginally reinforced when organizations have high-status clients, and is influenced by peers' heterodox choices. We discuss contributions to the neo-institutional theory of organizational choices, the socio-cultural analysis of field's evolution, and the strategic perspective of the firm.

Keywords: design agencies; institutional logics; heterodoxy; agences de design; logiques institutionnelles; hétérodoxie (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00563563
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Published in 2010, 45 p

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