The Ongoing Banking Crisis: another Proof of the Basel II Accord Inefficiency

Nathalie Janson
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Nathalie Janson: Pôle Finance Responsable - Rouen Business School - Rouen Business School

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Abstract: The "subprime crisis" seems to be another proof of the Basel II Accord inefficiency. Indeed capital regulation explicit aim is to deliver banking stability. The current state of the major banking systems in the leading economies demonstrates that it failed to achieve it. Therefore it is legitimate to ask : what is wrong with capital regulation ? BaselI had been revised not only under the pressure of the strong criticisms addressed by the industry but also because it did not foresee neither prevent the banking crises in Japan and in the northern European countries during the 1990's. Is capital regulation not just deemed to fail ? Since a major overhaul of the banking regulation at the international level is expected to take place in the following months, it is crucial to discuss that question given the cost of the current crisis in regards of the cost of the regulation itself.

Date: 2009-11
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Published in Gestion 2000, 2009, vol.26 (n°6), pp. 35-48

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