 Syndication et financement de l'innovation: motif de partage du risque versus expertiseSophie Pommet ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Venture capital firms are known as specific financial intermediaries, providing not only funds but also expertise to innovative projects. This paper analyses the consequences venture capital investments syndication for an expertise motive can have on investment decisionss and on post-investment involvement of investors. In that perspective, we use the analytical framework provided by the Soft (versus Hard) Budget Constraint literature and more specifically the paper published by Huand and Xu (2003) in which the capacity of syndication for risk diversification to refinance short-run inefficient project is examined. We develop an extension of that model in order to consider the specificity of syndication for expertise and what could be its impact on investors' specificity of syndication for expertise and what could be its impact on investors' refinancing decision. Then, the model discusses the conditions for which syndication for expertise motive may be more profitable for venture capitalists than syndication for a pure risk diversification motive. Keywords: venture capital; ressource-based strategy; syndication; capital-risque; motivation; approche fondée sur les ressources (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2010, 120 (4), pp.643-668 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00575473 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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