Ownership concentration and audit fees: do auditors matter most when investors are protected least ?

Cédric Lesage () and C. Ben Ali
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Cédric Lesage: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: Ownership concentration; audit fees; auditors; investors; protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-13
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Published in 2011 Auditing Section Midyear Conference & Doctoral Consortium, Jan 2011, Albuquerque, Canada

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00578311

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