Finitely repeated games with semi-standard

Tristan Tomala and Pauline Contou-Carrère ()
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Pauline Contou-Carrère: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

Keywords: Finitely repeated games; Semi-standard monitoring; Folk Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47 (1), pp.14-21. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.005⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00580938

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.005

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