Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives

Pierre Fleckinger ()

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Abstract: It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives.

Keywords: Informed Principal; Countervailing Incentives; Risk Neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00607075v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Economics Letters, 2007, 94 (2), pp.240-244. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039⟩

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Journal Article: Informed principal and countervailing incentives (2007)
Working Paper: Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00607075

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039

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