Perspectives juridiques et économiques sur les procédures négociées en droit de la concurrence

Frédéric Marty and Patrice Reis ()
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Patrice Reis: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Leniency programs, settlements and other forms of transactions are increasingly used in competition policy regarding both anticompetitive agreements and abuses of dominance. Such tools aim at improving the effectiveness and the efficiency of competition rules enforcement. Their fundamental purpose is to reinforce the dissuasion of anticompetitive practices by allowing competition authorities to decide quicker, easier and with more legal certainty, to give a more accurate answer to competitive concerns and to concentrate their limited resources on cases especially likely to harm competition. Despite their common denomination of "negotiated procedures", the real place of negotiation is very different from a procedure to another. In addition, the articulation of the different procedures might give opportunities for strategic uses that could, finally, undermine their initial purposes.

Keywords: Competition policy; negotiated procedures; leniency; commitments; effectiveness; strategic uses of legal resources; politique de concurrence; Procédures négociées; engagements; clémence; non contestation des griefs; transaction; effectivité; stratégies juridiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-02
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Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2011, Les Dossiers (4), pp.17-25

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Working Paper: Perspectives juridiques et économiques sur les procédures négociées en droit de la concurrence (2011)
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