Renégotiation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France
Philippe Gagnepain (),
Marc Ivaldi () and
David Martimort ()
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This paper describes the renegotiation of delegated management contracts in the French urban transport. We briefly describe the sector, sketch a theoretical model showing that contract renegotiation explains an increasing profile of subsidies over time. This model is finally estimated. Our analysis shows that wrongly assuming that local governments can fully commit to a profile of subsidies and do not renegotiate contracts leads to systematically overestimating the efficiency of firms in the sector.
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Published in Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2009, 60, pp.927-947
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Journal Article: Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00622833
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