Appropriation, violent enforcement and transaction costs: a critical survey

Mehrdad Vahabi

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Abstract: In this paper, I focus on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the "Political Coase Theorem" (PCT) lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory.

Keywords: Appropriation; Hobbesian state; Political Coase Theorem; Property rights approach; transaction costs; violent enforcement; Etat Hobbesien; théorème politique de Coase; approche en termes de droits de propriété; coûts de transaction; mise en œuvre violente (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00629109
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Published in Public Choice, 2011, 147 (1), pp.227-253. ⟨10.1007/s11127-010-9721-7⟩

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Journal Article: Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00629109

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9721-7

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