Post hoc rationalism in science

Eric Luis Uhlmann ()
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Eric Luis Uhlmann: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In advocating Bayesian Enlightenment as a solution to Bayesian Fundamentalism, Jones & Love (J&L) rule out a broader critique of rationalist approaches to cognition. However, Bayesian Fundamentalism is merely one example of the more general phenomenon of Rationalist Fundamentalism: the tendency to characterize human judgments as rational and optimal in a post hoc manner, after the empirical data are already known.

Keywords: post hoc; rationalism; science (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-25
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Published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2011, 34 (4), pp.204. ⟨10.1017/S0140525X11000410⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00629637

DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X11000410

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