Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Omer Biran () and Francoise Forges
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Omer Biran: CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty.. an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possible depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice.

Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 73 (1), pp.52-64. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.009⟩

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Journal Article: Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values (2011)
Working Paper: Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00632260

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.009

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