Contractually stable networks

Jean-François Caulier (), Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch ()
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Jean-François Caulier: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Vincent Vannetelbosch: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain

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Abstract: We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network speciÖes the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and e¢ ciency.

Keywords: Networks; Coalition Structures; Contractual Stability; Allocation Rules Networks; Strong efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00633611
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, 42 (2), pp.483-499. ⟨10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Contractually stable networks (2013)
Working Paper: Contractually stable networks (2013)
Working Paper: Contractually stable networks (2013)
Working Paper: Contractually Stable Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Contractually Stable Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Contractually stable networks (2008)
Working Paper: Contractually stable networks (2008)
Working Paper: Contractually Stable Networks (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00633611

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4

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